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2Bharat Trehan*
Knowledge of changes in private credit aggregates is useful in
interpreting the money/GNP relationship because it helps to distin-
guish shifts in asset demands by households from changes in the
demand for transactions balances by firms. This is necessary be-
cause both these changes have the same impact on money and in-
terest rates but have different implications for future GNP.
There exists a large body of work document-
ing movements in narrowly defined money
(Ml) as leading movements in economic activ-
ity. The monetarist tradition regards this as evi-
dence of causation, running from money to
GNP. However, even casual empiricism sug-
gests that this relationship has not been very
stable recently. The first example is the sharp
decline in the velocity of Ml over the second
half of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 (see
Judd, 1983, for a discussion). The second ex-
ample is the sharp slowdown in the growth rate
of money during the second half of 1983 (when
money slowed from a 12.4 percent annual rate
in the first half to a 7.2 percent rate in the sece
ond), which was followed by an unusually high
rate of GNP growth in the first half of 1984.
(For a more formal analysis of recent shifts in
the money-GNP relation see Simpson, 1984.)
These episodes underline the need for ob-
taining information beyond that contained in
the monetary aggregate when predicting future
output. Towards that end, this paper examines
what information can be obtained from move-
ments in credit aggregates. A simple model is
sketched out in which the money-output rela-
tionship over the business cycle is motivated in
a way that is the opposite of the usual mone-
tarist story. Changes in money growth precede
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changes in output as firms increase their de-
mand for transactions balances in order to fi-
nance plans to increase future output.
Within this framework, we first examine the
relationship between money and credit.
Changes in both credit and money precede
changes in output, and we show that changes
in credit provide information in addition to that
provided by both monetary aggregates and in-
terest rates. Our findings indicate, in fact, that
without knowledge about what has happened
to private credit, it is difficult to determine
what a change in money growth means for the
future course of economic activity. In contrast,
the connection between government borrowing
and future economic activity is not as clear-cut,
and the empirical results indicate that govern-
ment borrowing does not provide reliable in-
formation about future economic activity.
The key point of this paper is that informa-
tion on credit can help distinguish between dis-
turbances to money demand-money demand
"instability", in other words-and disturbances
to credit demand, which also affect the stock of
money because the demand for credit is in fact
a demand for payments media. Positive distur-
bances to either will lead to increases in the
quantity ofmoney and to a rise in interest rates.
However, the future course of economic activ-
ity depends upon precisely where the distur-
bance originates. Information on credit aggre-
gates is useful because it provides a means for
pinpointing the source of the disturbance. Em-pirical analysis supports this hypothesis. Sec-
tion IV presents equations for real and nominal
GNP as well as equations for M1 velocity, and
shows that changes in several types of private
credit are significant in explaining changes in
those variables.
I. Households' Demand fOr Money
Since households operate under a wealth
constraint, any change in money holdings not
accompanied by a change in wealth must be
matched by an opposite change in the holdings
of other assets. In the simplified model consid-
ered below, the only other asset available to
households consists of loans to firms. Thus, an
increase in the demand for money must be off-
set by a decrease in the supply of loans. More
generally, the point is that changes in house-
holds' asset demand for money will affect credit
market conditions. Below, we show how this
leads to a role for credit aggregates in predict-
ing future activity.
Before doing that, however, it is useful to
examine what factors can cause changes in
households' demand for money and to discuss
how relevant these factors are likely to be. In-
tuitively, it appears that expectations about fu-
ture conditions are important determinants of
the households' demand for money. For in-
stance, Friedman and Schwartz state that ex-
pectations of instability due to the outbreak of
war cause money demand to go Up.1
Perhaps a more obvious example of a period
during which the household demand for money
will increase significantly is a recession. When
a recession occurs, or is perceived as likely to
occur, individuals tend to become more cau-
tious and to retain money balances since they
think that there is a greater chance of being
unemployed. Furthermore, the more severe or
prolonged the recession, the greater the shift in
households' expectations of future income. As
a consequence, the increase in money demand
will be higher as well.
Some evidence consistent with this hypothe-
sis is provided by the behavior of velocity dur-
ing recessions. (Recall that velocity is defined
as the ratio ofreal GNP to real money balances,
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so that an increase in money demand due to
expectational factors leads to a decline in ve-
locity.) The first example is the behavior ofve-
locity during the period from late 1982 through
early 1983. The fact that the 1982 recession was
the worst since the Great Depression and that
it followed very closely on the heels of the
recession in 1980 must have made a substantial
psychological impact on households, leading to
an increase in money demand.2 Exactly the
same thing happened during the Great Depres-
sion: Ml velocity declined practically contin-
ually from the first quarter of 1929 to the first
quarter of 1933, with the sharpest declines oc-
curring in three of the last four quarters ofthis
period. While both the examples above are
rather extreme, they provide some support for
the hypothesis that expectational factors are im-
portant determinants of money demand.
Previous researchers have, of course, consid-
ered the role of movements in various credit
aggregates in forecasting economic activity.
Perhaps the most well-known is the work done
by Benjamin Friedman (see Friedman, 1985,
and the references there). In contrast to the
approach below, his work focuses on the deter-
minants of asset demands to show why credit
aggregates matter. Itrelies heavily upon the ob-
served stability of the debt-income ratio in the
post-war period (see Friedman, 1981). Fried-
man also showed that movements in domestic
nonfinancial debt contained information at
least as useful as any of the monetary aggre-
gates about movements in GNP. However, sub-
sequent empirical research has shown that at
least some of his results hinge upon economet-
ric technicalities (see Porter and Offenbacher,
1983, and Froewiss and Judd 1979). Moreover,
the ratio of nonfinancial debt to income has
been rising since 1980.II. A Simplified Model
The importance of information about credit
aggregates can be shown in a simple framework
in which there are only three types of decision-
makers: firms, households and banks.
In this framework, we assume that firms de-
sire to increase output levels as a result of pos-
itive shocks to productivity (King and Plosser,
1984). Positive shocks to productivity could oc-
cur, for instance, when new technology makes
it profitable for firms to increase production.
Because production planning and implemen-
tation takes time, firms wishing to produce
more tomorrow must begin accumulating the
needed productive resources today. Not all the
funds needed by a firm are likely to be available
internally, so it must borrow. It is worth point-
ing out that this accumulation of money bal-
ances for future use is what Keynes called the
finance motive for holding money, describing it
as the "coping stone" of the liquidity theory of
money demand.
Businesses have two sources from which to
borrow: banks and households. It is assumed,
for simplicity, that households do not borrow
from banks, although they add to or reduce
their holdings ofbank balances by withdrawing
or depositing currency. (It is also assumed that
the supply of currency is perfectly elastic, that
is, the monetary authority supplies the amount
of currency demanded.) Thus, firms are the
only borrowers. Which source firms draw on
for their funds, however, is critical in determin-
ing how money and credit behave and, in par-
ticular, in determining which will be a better
indicator of future economic activity. In the
event firms borrow from banks, new transac-
tions deposits are created that add to the stock
of money outstanding. In contrast, business
borrowing from households simply transfers
transactions deposits from households to firms.
In the former case, both money and credit are








Household Loan MarketWe turn, now, to a diagrammatic exposition
of the analytic framework in this paper. Three
markets are ofinterest in the model: the market
for bank loans; the market for household loans,
that is, lending by households to firms; and the
market for bank deposits. In Figure 1, o111ythe
markets for bank loans and household loans are
shown. The deposit market is redundant in the
sense that developments in the deposit market
can be incorporated in what happens in either
the household loan or the bank loan market.
In the market for bank loans, Figure la,
firms' demand for bank loans is represented by
BLD . The quantity of bank loans demanded in-
creases with a lower bank loan rate, rb. Also,
BLD is implicitly a function of the rate house-
holds charge for loans to businesses, with a
higher household loan rate, rh, increasing firms'
demand for banks' loans.
The supply of bank loans varies directly with
the rate of interest on loans and inversely with
the rate that banks must pay for their deposits,
rd. An increase in rb induces banks to lend
more, creating new deposits for funding. The
reserves necessary to support the new deposits
come from several sources: from an inflow of
currency from the public as banks raise the rate
they are willing to pay on deposits; from banks
reducing their holdings of excess reserves; and
frOll partial accollllodation of the increase in
bank credit by the monetary authority.3 Notice
that the bank loan supply curve is based on
maximizing behavior by the banks and, in the
absence of rigidities or imperfections, this im-
plies equilibrium in the bank reserves market.
Figure Ib shows the market for household
lending to firms. Business demand for loans
from households, HLD , is negatively related to
the rate charged on these loans, rh' and (im-
plicitly) positively related to the rate firms must
pay for bank loans, rb. The supply ofhousehold
loans, HLs, responds positively to rho It is neg-
atively related to the rate banks pay on depos-
its, rd' with households offering a smaller sup-
ply of loans to businesses when banks pay a
higher return on deposits.
We are now in a position to examine why
changes in the quantity of credit provide useful
Figure 2






Household Loan Marketinformation about the future course of the
economy. To see this, two different situations
are contrasted below.
Consider, first, what happens when firms de-
cide to supply greater output in the next time
period. If the increased demand for credit is
manifested first in the market for bank loans,
the demand curve BLD shifts from BL?to BL~.
The resulting increase in rb forces some firms
into the nonbank market, that is, HLD shifts
out. Consequently, rh increases. Arbitrage be-
tween the two loan markets will continue until
interest rates are brought back into equality.4
In equilibrium, the quantity of both bank and
nonbank loans has increased and so has the rate
of interest. Since loans are positively related to
deposits, both deposits and money supply are
higher as well. In the context of the present
model, both the interest rate and the money
supply provide evidence of increased demand
for credit and predict increased output in the
next period.
Now, consider an alternative scenario. As-
sume that household demand for money in-
creases, so that the supply of credit by house-
holds declines. In Figure 3 below, two things
happen. First, the HLs curve shifts from Hq
toHq.
Second, since households do not lend this
money to firms, but hold it as deposits, banks
can use the money to make new loans. Thus,
the bank loan supply curve shifts from Bq to
BL~. Note that the increase in loan supply by
banks will be smaller (in absolute terms) than
the decrease in loan supply by households for
two reasons. First, households will not increase
deposit holdings by the exact amount of the in-
crease in money demand (or decrease in loan
supply) because part of their money holdings
will be held as currency. Second, banks will not
be able to lend out the entire amount of the









An Increase in the Household's Demand for Money
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32Now, as a result ofthese shifts, rh exceeds rb'
Therefore, firms will begin to move from the
household loan market to the bank loan mar-
ket. As a result HLD moves in and BLD moves
out. Thus, the two rates move towards each
other and equilibrium is restored when the two
are equal. At the new equilibrium, interest
rates will be higher than before. This follows
because as a result of a decrease in the willing-
ness to lend; total credit supply has declined
with no shift in the demand for credit. The new
equilibrium interest·rates are Tt; and r~. Since
bank loans have increased, the quantity of
money will be higher as well.
Thus, as far as the impact on money and in-
terest is concerned, this scenario is no different
from the first one. But the implications for fu-
ture GNP are entirely different. In the first
case, higher interest rates and money were in-
dicators of a future rise in GNP. In the second,
there is no such implication. Indeed, to the ex"
tent that higher interest rates discourage eco-
nomic activity, future GNP will be lower in this
case.
The only way to discriminate between the
two cases is to look at the credit aggregates.
Non-bank credit (household lending) increases
in the first, but declines in the second. This
difference in performance provides a way of
discriminating accurately between the two
cases. Movementsintotal private credit-bank
plus non-bank lending-similarly allow one to
discriminate between the two.5
It is tempting to conclude that changes in
government borrowing will play the same sort
of role as private borrowing did in the model
above. However, for this to be true, changes in
government borrowing must be causally related
to changes in future economic activity. An im-
portant reason that this may not be true has to
do with the procyclical nature ofthe budget def-
icit. During recessions, for example, tax reve-
nues decrease while outlays increase because of
higher cyclically sensitive government expen-
ditures such as unemployment benefits. Thus,
government borrowing goes up during periods
when income is low. However, this borrowing
is intended to cushion household income from
cyclical vagaries and does not directly influence
future output. This source of borrowing will,
therefore, offset any positive correlation be-
tween future output and federal borrowing due
to the other federal expenditures. Thus, it is
likely that changes in federal borrowing will not
provide useful information about changes in fu-
ture output.
The discussion above is based primarily on
two hypotheses. First, firms borrow money to
increase production over the course ofthe busi-
ness cycle. Thus, changes in credit lead changes
in economic activity. Further, since firms satisfy
part of their needs by borrowing from banks,
and since loans by banks and demand deposits
are positively correlated, changes in money
lead changes in economic activity as well. Sec-
ond, the household demand for money function
is subject to shifts due to changes in expecta-
tions. These shifts in the money demand func-
tion will be reflected in the demands for other
financial assets, such as the financial liabilities
of firms.
Thus, movements in private credit should
provide significant information about future ac-
III. Empirical Tests
tivity and also be important in explaining
money growth. This section presents empirical
tests for both these propositions.
First, several alternative "forecasting" equa-
tions for real output have been estimated with
the intent of testing whether changes in private
credit predict changes in output. These equa-
tions are similar to those presented in earlier
work, for instance, Friedman (1983). The basic
equation includes real federal high employment
expenditures and real money balances as ex-
planatory variables. To this, the real rate of in-
terest and alternative credit measures have
been successively added and tests made to de-
termine the significance of the additional
variables.
Second, essentially the same equation has
33been estimated for nominal GNP. The attrac-
tion in estimating such an equation is that the
results are directly comparable to previous re-
search. For instance, the well-known "St.
Louis" equations (from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis) also regress GNP on money
and High Employment Federal Expenditures.
(Note, however, that the St. Louis equations
view money as being exogenous, that is, all
changes in money are viewed as being policy-
induced.)
Finally, an equation for velocity is estimated
to test the money demand implications. The ve-
locity equation is derived from a money de-
mand specification in which the demand for
money is expressed as a function of income and
interest rates and in which nominal money bal-
ances adjust to desired balances with a lag. Dif-
ferent credit variables are then included in this
basic equation to determine whether they help
predict movements in velocity.
Quarterly data was used over the period
1959:Ql to 1984:Q2. The beginning date is dic-
tated by the availability of the Ml series. The
interest rate used is the three-month Treasury
bill rate. All credit variables are expressed as
flows. Of the different measures of credit em-
ployed below, the widest aggregate is Domestic
Nonfinancial Debt (which is the variable used
by Benjamin Friedman). This is decomposed
into Federal Debt and Private Debt (the latter
is not strictly accurate since it includes state and
local government borrowing).
Finally, two other measures are also consid-
ered-totalloans by commercial banks and to-
tal loans by financial institutions other than
banks. This is in line with the discussion above,
which distinguished between bank and non-
bank sources of credit. Obviously, these vari-
ables are not ideal for the purpose at hand. For
instance, because banks may, in the short run,
vary managed liabilities such as Certificates of
Deposit when the volume of loans changes, the
loans-to-money link may not be as tight. Simi-
larly, loans by financial institutions serve only
as a proxy for loans by households.
Consider now, the real GNP equations in Ta-
ble 1. The dependent variable is the rate of
growth of real GNP. For all independent vari-
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ables, except the rate of interest, the GNP de-
flatorhas been used to transform nominal val-
ues to real values. The real rate of interest has
beenobtained by subtracting the expected rate
of inflation (in terms of the GNP deflator
again) from the nominal rate of interest. The
expected rate of inflation is itself obtained by
estimating a univariate time series equation for
inflation. (An alternate method for obtaining
the real rate, where actual inflation was used
instead of expected inflation, produced results
thatwere essentially the same as those reported
below.) All independent variables are included
in growth rate terms, except for the interest
rate, which is included as a difference.
Current and two lagged values have been in-
cluded for all explanatory variables (except the
lagged dependent variable and the time trend).
For four of these variables (money, private
credit, the Treasury bill rate and loans by fi-
nancial institutions), this length was selected by
imposing the condition that the F statistic (for
the null hypothesis that current and lagged val-
ues of the variable being tested are all zero)
have a marginal significance level of at most
0.05 and that the standard error ofthe equation
not increase when additional lags were added.
The same lag length was chosen for the other
credit aggregates to ensure comparability. It
should be pointed out that for these latter vari-
ables,the results will not change if the lag
length is altered. Finally, only one lag for the
dependent variable was included since the sec-
ond lag is insignificant across all specifications.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for these
equations. For each independent variable (in-
cluding lags), I report the marginal significance
levels for the F test. The marginal significance
level (M.S.L.) can be can be interpreted as the
probability that the variable under considera-
tionhas no impact on GNP. Conventionally, the
variable is regarded as significant if this prob-
ability is less than 0.05. Thus, in the first equa-
tion the M.S.L. for the F test on money is
0.0001, which implies that the probability that
changes in money have no impact on GNP is
extremely small. Equation 1 also includes real
federal high employment expenditures, which
do not seem to affect output significantly. No-tice that Durbin'sh statistic shows significant debt. From the last two equations, it can be
evidence of serial correlation. The second seen that loans by financial institutions have
equation adds therealrate ofinterestto Equa- somewhat greater explanatory power for real
tion 1. The explanatory power ofthe equation GNPthan do loans by commercial banks.
increases,.whiletheserialicorrelationdeclines. Somesilllpletest~to examine the stability.of
In Equations 3 through 7, different credit the coefficients onthecreditvariables were also
variables are added to the set of explanatory carried out. The samplewassplit at two differ-
variables in Equation 2. Equation 3 includes entplaces to see whether there was any evi-
therate ofgrowthofprivate credit. Noticethat denceofastructuralbreak. Thefirst split was
the credit variable is highlysignificant.andthat at1971:Q2, where Sims (1980) found evidence
the h statistic (testing for the presence ofserial of a. structural break in a system that inclUded
correlation) is close to zero. Also notice that output, money growth, and prices. Second,the
the M.S.L. on lagged real GNP jumps to 0.8. data was also split at 1979:Q3 to examine
In Equation 4, the rate of growth of federal whether the change in operating procedures by
borrowing is included. This variable is clearly the Federal Reserve at that time had any im-
insignificant and iF is actually lower than in pact. Tests were then carried out to examine
Equation 2. In the next equation, total domes- whetherthe coefficients of the credit variables
tic nonfinancial debt is also insignificant, al- (at a specific lag as well as for all lags taken
though it is more "significant" than federal together) had changed.
TABLE 1






















2 3 4 5 6 7
PVT FED TOT TLFI TLCB
Marginal Levels of Explanatory Variables
.0001 .001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
.12 .03 .13 .10 .02 .051
.007 .04 .01 .007 .12 .02
.0002 .76 .18 .003 .04
.04 .8 .03 .056 .058 .17
.18 .03 .24 .13 .09 .09
.433 .532 .415 .440 .498 .464
.596 .487 .608 .582 .522 .558
1.22 0.34 2.09 .07 .84 .98
Notes: (1) All variables are in real terms and in rates of growth, except that the rate of interest term is included as a
difference. HEXP is federal high employment expenditure. CDT represents the credit variable. To see
which credit variable is included in a particular equation, look at the top of the relevant column. Thus, in
equation 3, PVT (that is, private credit) is included. FED is federal borrowing and TOT is total domestic
nonfinancial borrowing. FITL is total loans by financial institutions and CBTL is total loans by commercial
banks. The current value and two lags have been included for each of these variables. RGNPLl is the
lagged dependent variable.
(2) The Marginal Significance Level (M.S.L.) for a particular variable can be interpreted as the probability that
the variable has no impact on the dependent variable (real output in this case). Conventionally, a variable is
considered important in a particular equation if it has a M.S.L. of .05 or less.
35For the split at 1971:02, it was possible to
reject the hypothesis ofno shift at the 5 percent
level only for the contemporaneous value ofdo-
mestic nonfinancial debt (TOT) and for the first
lag ofloans by commercial banks; ForthespIit
at 1979:03, the federal debt variable shows evi-
dence of a shift at all lags individually and to-
gether, a result that is not very surprising given
the large Treasury borrowings of recent years.
Summary statistics for the nominal GNP
equations are presented in Table 2. The vari-
ables are defined in the same way as in Table
1, with the exception that all variables are now
expressed in nominal terms. (Neither lagged
values ofGNP nor a time trend were significant
here.)
Once again, the rate of interest is significant
in predicting changes in nominal GNP. Adding
private credit improves the fit of the equation
even futher. Notice that adding federal borrow-
ing reduces iP again and that the total debt
variable has a M.S.L. of.25. Both the loan vari-
ables, total loans by financial institutions
(TLFI) and total loans by commercial banks
(TLCB), are significant at 1 percent.
The significant credit variables were also
tested to see if the coefficients had shifted over
time. For the break at 1971:02, it was not pos-
sible to reject stability for any of the coeffi-
cients. For the break at 1979:03, the private
debt and commercialbank loan variables show
no evidence of a shift, while TLFI does.
Consider, now, Table 3 which presents the
results for the velocity equation. As discussed
above, the estimated equation is derivedfrolll.
a money demand equation, with the additional
constraint that the coefficient on real income in
the estimated money demand equation equal
1.6 The first equation includes only the rate of
interest and a lagged money term. Successive
equations then add different credit variables.
Table 3 also shows that while private credit is
significant in predicting velocity, neitherfederal
nor total credit are. Total loans by financial in-
stitutions are significant here (as in the GNP
equations) but loans by commercial banks are
not.
Credit variables in the velocity equation were
also tested to see if they showed any signs of a
shift. However, for neither the break at
1971:02 nor the break at 1979:03 can the hy-
pothesis of no shift be rejected.
TABLE 2


















2 3 4 5 6 7
NPVT NFED NTOT NTLFI NTLCB
Marginal Significance Levels of Explanatory Variables
.----~
.0001 .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
.04 .0052 .064 .056 .005 .013
.0001 .0008 .0001 .0002 .002 .0001
.0005 .80 .25 .010 .013
.451 .539 .439 .458 .502 .499
.607 .509 .620 .599 .550 .554
1.63 1.86 1.59 1.74 1.72 1.81
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for explanations. The variables are the same as in Table 1 except that they are all































PVT FED TOT TLFI TLCB
.578 .609 .595 .596 .563
.206 .267 .255 .216 .249
.438 .480 .475 .430 .478
.076 .068 .053 .006 .079
.015 - .0002 .005 .0045 .0017
.016 -.0001 .004 .0015 .0016
-.003 .00 .005 .0067 - .0002
-.253 -.105 .165 -.216 -.122
Marginal Significance Levels
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
.01 .65 .72 .02 .10
.02 .31 .14 .04 .23
.413 .353 .351 .405 .385
.714 .786 .789 .724 .749
1.95 1.76 1.86 1.92 1.94
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth of velocity. See Tables 1 and 2 for an explanation of variables. M1LP is
the lagged money term. NTBR1L is NTBR lagged one quarter, NTBR2L is NTBR lagged 2 quarters.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has presented some theoretical ar-
guments and empirical evidence to show that
changes in private credit willprovide useful in-
formation about changes in f\Iture output and
Ml velocity. Previous analyses of.the money/
GNP relationship have often tended to focus
on the asset demand for money and,conse-
quently, emphasized.the. substitutability be-
tween money and credit. Incontrast, explicit
attention was paid earlier in this paper to the
need for money to carry out transactions. In
this framework, it is easy to see how money and
credit can vary in the same direction-because
the demand for credit.can be viewed as a de-
mand for payments media.
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For the policymaker, this means that infor-
mation about changes in money and.interest
rates alone is not sufficient for predicting what
will happen to output. To determinetheimpli-
cations of.a change ·in money, it is·important
also to know how the credit aggregates are be-
having. The evidence presented above is also
specific about what credit aggregates areusefuL
It indicates thatchallgesin federal government
borrowing are notsignificantly related to GNP,
while several measures ofprivatecrediLare.
The most recent example ofthephel1omenon
captured in these tests is what happelledinlate
1982 when declining.output was accompanied
by rising money but falling private borrowing.Although the analysis above has focused on
recessions as periods when changes in (private)
credit aggregates are likely to provide signifi-
cant information, the underlying logic can be
applied more widely. The argument of this pa-
per has been that changes in credit provide a
direct means to determine whether the money
demand function has shifted (regardless of the
sQurce of the change), and that this knowledge
is necessary to interpret the money-output re-
lationship properly.
FOOTNOTES
1. Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 39), when specifying
the arguments of the money demand function, state "an-
other variable that is likely to be important empirically is
the degree of economic stability expected to prevail in the
future. Wealthholders are likely to attach considerably more
value to liquidity when they expect economic conditions to
be unstable than when they expect them to be highly stable
... For example, the outbreak of war clearly produces ex-
pectations of instability, which is one reason war is often
accompanied by a notable increase in real balances.. ."
2. Others have also suggested the possibility of a shift in
the money demand function during the 1982 recession. For
example, Axilrod (1984), when discussing the decline in
velocity in 1982, states "During part of the period, eco-
nomic uncertainties may have heightened precautionary
demands for cash." Later, he says that he expects velocity
to increase in the near future, which "would be consistent
with the view that some of the previous decline was a re-
flection of precautionary demand for cash balances, bal-
ances that can be expected to be unwound as confidence
in the economy is restored." Similarly, Simpson (1984, p.
259) says "In late 1981 and early 1982, the demand for
NOW accounts, passbook savings, and other very liquid
assets in household portfolios strengthened while trans-
actions demands weakened and rates dropped only mod-
erately, perhaps reflecting a desire to be better able to
cushion an earnings disruption, which at that time seemed
more likely."
3. The shape of the bank loan supply curve depends upon
the monetary authority's behavior. To see this, consider the
two extremes of behavior by the monetary authority. As-
sume first that the monetary authority accommodates all
increases in credit demand, which would happen, for in-
stance, if it were trying to peg the interest rate. In such a
situation, the supply curve of bank loans would be hori-
zontal, because the monetary authority stands ready to
supply all the reserves for deposit (and loan) expansion.
The other extreme is where the monetary authority does
not accommodate any cyclical increase in credit demand.
Such a situation may occur, for instance, if the authority is
following a fixed money growth rule. In this case, banks
can increase loans only by inducing the public to hold more
deposits. The supply curve for loans would then be much
steeper and, given a limit to the amount of deposits that
individuals wish to hold, would ultimately become vertical.
The assumption in the text is that the authority's behavior
lies somewhere in between these two extremes. It can also
be shown that changes in the credit aggregate convey sig-
nificant information even if the monetary authority follows
one of the above policies.
4. The analysis suppresses the shift in bank loan supply
due to a change in rh and a similar impact of rb on house-
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hOld loan supply, These effects arise through the deposit
market. For example, if the rate on bank loans goes up,
banks are likely to begin offering higher rates on demand
dElj)osits. As a result, hOUSeholds will decrease loan supply
and. increase deposit holdings.
5.•It is interesting to examine whether the model sketched
above is robust to some generalizations. Consider, first, the
assumption that demand deposits are the only liabilities of
banks. In a more general setting, one would also have to
consider other liabilities such as certificates of deposit
(CDs). Does the existence of CDs destroy the positive link
between loans and demand deposits? Intuitively, the an-
swer appears to be no. If it is true that banks face rising
marginal costs to increasing either demand deposits or
CDs, banks will increase both types of liabilities together.
In equilibrium, the bank must face the same marginal cost
for poth liabilities, otherwise it is always possible to de-
crease costs by substituting the cheaper liability for the
more expensive. Thus, it is unlikely that the amount of bank
loans willirttrease significantly without an increase in de-
mand deposits.
Consider next, the implications of allowing households to
hold a third asset in addition to loans and money, say eq-
uity. In this case, increased demand for liquidity will not be
matched exactly by a decrease in the supply of loans to
firms. Instead, households will reduce equity holdings as
well. Once again, the household is unlikely to obtain the
necessary balances by selling equity holdings only. Since
the shift in liquidity preference does not alter the relative
price of loans to equity, holdings of both will be reduced.
Thus, the qualitative result is unchanged-firms must still
turn to the banking sector for loans.
6. The demand for nominal money can be written (in log
form) as
where Mi denotes desired nominal money balances,
Yt denotes real income,
Rt denotes the nominal rate of interest, and
Pt denotes the price level
Then, under the assumption that actual money balances
do not adjust at once to desired, we have
Mt - Mt_, = A(Mi Mt_,)·
Substituting this in the equation above gives
Mt = A(aYt - f3Rt) + (1 A) Mt_, + APt·
Next, subtract Pt from both sides to obtain an expression
for real balances.
Mt - Pt A(aYt - f3Rt) + (1 A) (Mt-, - Pt).
Imposing the condition that the coefficient on real income
is 1 and transposing gives an expression for velocity that
is the estimated Equation 1 of Table 3.REFERENCES
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